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IMPROVING THE EFFECIENCY OF DEFENSE AUCTIONS: 







The purpose of this MBA Project was to investigate auction theory to obtain a 
means of coupling market-research and final contract objectives.  Federal buyer’s have 
imperfect information regarding what could best meet needs and have difficulty obtaining 
information.  A multi-stage auction model was designed and compared to current single-
stage auctions.  The multi-stage auction improves total buyer’s surplus, actual buyer’s 
surplus and selects the ideal seller more frequently.  The multi-stage auction may be 
implemented without major policy changes and may be used effectively in contracts for 
services, or in contingent environments.    
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Ideal Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) auctions include an initial 
information gathering phase.1  Individual agents are assigned tasks to perform.  End-users 
are responsible for generating a cost estimate and articulating the ultimate requirement.  
Contracting officers are primarily responsible for conducting market research and 
developing an acquisition strategy.  Ideally, the information gathering process translates 
into evaluation criteria and contract metrics that accomplish mission objectives.  In 
practice it is not clear that the right information is learned, or that it is translated into 
contract and mission objectives because there is no objectively determined quality 
standard.  The FAR mandates completion but quality is subjectively determined.  
Criticism leveled at the Department of Defense (DoD) acquisition community by many in 
the press,2 government,3 and think tanks,4 evidences that acquisition teams may not 
always translate information into objectives correctly.   
Complexity makes the problem more difficult for acquisition teams.  There can be 
hundreds, or just a few, attributes that may be applicable to a particular objective.  Market 
research is designed to address the attribute problem, however, it is difficult to gather 
accurate, relevant data.  Additionally, acquisition teams operate within a structured 
regulatory process that is usually conducted sequentially.  Each factor is both 
independent and dependent making it difficult to synchronize the information into a 
performable contract and achieve objectives.  For example, requirement generation is an 
independent problem because it must be solved in-and-of itself, but dependant because it 
                                                 
1 FAR Parts 7, 10, & 11. 
2 Renae Merle, “Problems Stall Pentagon's New Fighting Vehicle,” Washington Post, February 7, 
2007, A01; http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/02/06/AR2007020601997.html, 
Retrieved November 2007.  
3 GAO-06-110, “Better Support of Weapons Systems Program Managers Needed to Improve 
Outcomes,” November 2005, http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d06110.pdf, Retrieved October 2007.  
4 Chris Edwards, “Government Schemes Cost More Than Promised,” CATO Institute, Tax and Policy 
Bulletin, No. 17, September 2003, http://www.cato.org/pubs/tbb/tbb-0309-17.pdf, Retrieved August 2007.  
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has to be coupled with market research and related to eventual outcomes.  At present, 
there is no mechanism to objectively solve and couple each independent element into 
final contract objectives, other than subjective judgment.   
There are two primary difficulties compounding the information discovery 
process.  First, the buyer and each individual seller are attempting to unilaterally optimize 
the requirement given asymmetric distribution of information.  Secondly, it is difficult to 
know with certainty what the optimal combination of attributes is to achieve given 
objectives.   
1. Asymmetric Information 
Information is asymmetric if one or more parties to an auction have some level of 
private information.5  On the other hand, information is symmetric when it is common to 
all parties.  In the information gathering phase each individual party has some incentive 
to gather as much privately held information as possible, while simultaneously protecting 
their own private information.   
The information gathering phase is similar to a trip to a car dealership.  The seller 
would like to reveal as little as possible about the true cost of car, to gain as much margin 
as possible.  Contrarily the buyer has an incentive to reveal as little as possible about their 
true willingness to pay, to gain as good a deal as possible.  Each party has private 
information they would prefer to protect and information they are attempting to capture.   
In the case of the federal auction the buyer’s private information includes the 
budget allotment, what attributes are most valued, and how the evaluation will be 
conducted.  Each individual seller’s private information includes their means and 
methods of production, the cost function, and their anticipated profits.  Buyer’s would 
prefer to protect information about their budget allotment because if revealed all seller’s 
                                                 
5 Kenneth Hendricks and Robert H. Porter, “An Empirical Study of an Auction with Asymmetric 




26c1%3DAND%26wc%3Don%26sd%3D%26ed%3D%26la%3D, Retrieved November 2007. 
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with cost functions below the budget amount have an incentive to price at total budget; 
buyer’s also prefer to gain as much information about the true cost of production and the 
price trade-offs from each individual seller.  Sellers’ prefer to guard their proprietary data 
to protect current and future profits while simultaneously learning as much information as 
possible about the true budget allotment.   
There is also symmetric information within the early auction processes.  Common 
data may, or may not, include elements such as the number of likely competitors, general 
industry knowledge, and on-going market trends.  However, it is the asymmetric 
knowledge that makes gathering meaningful data related to objectives difficult.      
2. Requirement Asymmetry 
The problem of requirement generation is primarily a combinatorial optimization 
problem.  It is reasonable to assume that the primary objective of the requiring agency is 
to achieve the maximum benefit per dollar cost.  For a given objective, what’s the 
optimal combination of reliability, sustainability, speed, weight, maneuverability, et 
cetera?  The optimal solution may not be readily apparent because it is contextual and 
difficult to measure.   
The buyer has private information about what they value most.  There is some 
incentive for the buyer to reveal the optimal attribute array to ensure they achieve their 
objectives; however, if the buyer does not know what they want, they have an incentive 
to be ambiguous.  
Each potential seller has private information about what combination of 
requirements would provide the buyer the most benefit, in that sellers are generally more 
familiar than the buyer with the capabilities and limitations of current and cutting-edge 
technologies. Each potential seller also has private information about their individual cost 
function, however, and is biased in favor of it.  For example, if a sellers’ cost function 
affords them an advantage in producing a maneuverable aircraft, they will try to market 
and sell a maneuverable aircraft.  Sellers’ have an incentive to reveal requirement 
optimization information that is most advantageous to their individual profits, but not 
necessarily the optimal good or service from the buyer’s stand-point.   
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3. Regulatory Environment  
The FAR offers broad regulatory guidance in developing requirements and 
conducting market research.6  The level of research effort should be appropriate for the 
complexity of the requirement and the market.  Performance or end-state requirements 
definitions are encouraged for use.   
More complex, expensive acquisitions require a formal Acquisition Strategy 
Plan.7  The contents of the formal plan are detailed and exhaustive, requiring the 
acquisition team to address 29 individual issues that relate to the unique acquisition.   
The information gathering regulatory system is relatively broad and instructive.  
The primary constraint is not necessarily within any subcategory, but in the sequencing. 
Agencies must complete all phases of information gathering prior to soliciting 
requirements.8  A FAR—Part 15 negotiated acquisition is processed in the following 
order: 
• Define need 
• Conduct Market research 
• Acquisition planning 
• Conduct auction 
• Evaluate offers 
• Award 
It is a linear process that is easy to understand, however, its aggregate quality is 
dependant upon the quality and availability of information gained early.  It is possible to 
make any number of errors in gathering and relating the information to the acquisition 
objectives.   
                                                 
6 FAR 10.001, 10.002, & 11.002. 
7 FAR 7.104 & 7.105. 
8 FAR 10.001(a)(ii). 
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B. COUPLING PROBLEM 
Final acquisition outcomes are in part dependent upon identifying the applicable 
cost and attribute trade-offs in the earliest stages and making them correctly.  Information 
is difficult to gather and evaluate in the early stages due to the existence of asymmetric 
information.   
Any given buyer is interested in how other buyers buy and how sellers sell, i.e., 
how the market typically operates.  The highest value information is relevant to cost and 
the trade-offs among the array of attributes; however, sellers have very little incentive to 
reveal their individual cost functions truthfully because the information is proprietary.  
Even if any given contractor’s costs were somehow known, it would only be applicable 
to that individual contractor, so may not translate well into overall acquisition strategy 
and contract objectives.   
An additional problem is the regulatory segmentation of the problem.  While 
requirement generation and market research may be conducted simultaneously, an 
auction cannot begin until both processes are complete.  The segmentation discounts the 
possibility that learning could take place intra-auction that may be advantageous to the 
buyer and the eventual seller(s).   
C. RESEARCH OBJECTIVE 
The dual objective of this research is to develop a more efficient auction model 
and to demonstrate that the defense acquisition process is currently less efficient than it 
could be.  A general form model will serve to describe the more generic auction process.  
Secondary objectives include exploring whether a new model can withstand regulatory 
compliance and the impact that an efficient model may have upon defense outcomes.  
The impact segment will go as far downstream as possible to demonstrate the robustness 
the model may have upon the system.  Furthermore, the contingency contracting and 
service contracting impacts will be discussed.   
 6
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. AUCTIONS 
Auctions are commonly used as a mechanism to buy and sell goods and services.  
They’re widely used by sellers to allocate resources such as art, livestock, estates, the 
electromagnetic spectrum, and the wide-array of products available on eBay.  Buyers 
may use auctions to obtain services such as home construction and land and water use 
rights.  It is widely agreed that there are four common auction types utilized: English, 
Dutch, first-price sealed-bid, and second-price sealed-bid auctions.9 
  1. English Auctions 
The English auction is the most widely known auction and begins when a bidder, 
or an auctioneer, announces an opening bid (also called open auction).  The entry bid is 
typically on the low-range of the expected final sales price of the unit.  All bidders are 
then invited to raise the price above the previously highest bid.  The auction continues in 
the same sequential manner until there is only one bidder left, the highest bidder, and no 
one wishes to raise the bid. 
There is both symmetric and asymmetric information within any particular 
auction.  Before the bidding occurs all potential bidders have some private information—
how highly they value the item.  As bidding commences, the private willingness to pay of 
all bidders (except for the winner) is eventually revealed, as the highest price they were 
willing to pay, before they refused to continue.  Therefore information begins asymmetric 
and ends more symmetrically distributed.   
The fact that the bidders are able to see others’ value for the same object and is 
conducted sequentially distinguishes it from other auctions.   
                                                 
9 Michael R. Baye, Managerial Economics and Business Strategy, Boston: Irwin McGraw-Hill, 2000, 
Note: The Auctions segment follows Chapter 12 and is generally attributed to Bate, unless noted.  
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2. Dutch Auctions 
The Dutch auction begins when an auctioneer announces a price that is 
excessively high for the lot.  The auctioneer continues to reduce price incrementally until 
one person agrees to buy at the last price announced.   
Information is asymmetrically distributed through the entire auction, until the end.  
No individual bidder knows any other bidders’ willingness to pay until the end.  The 
seller also does not know anything about any bidder’s private value.  Note also that the 
auction is equivalent to a simultaneous auction because no individual has any information 
other than their individual private value until the end of the auction (at which point all 
private information is irrelevant).    
3. First-Price Sealed Bid Auctions 
The first-price auction begins when an auctioneer invites bidder to document their 
bid for an object and forward the price to the seller.  The auction closes when the 
auctioneer opens the bids and grants the highest bidder the lot.  The buyer pays the 
amount they submitted on the bidding document.   
Information is asymmetrically distributed throughout the entire auction, until the 
end.  The first-price auction is also simultaneous, similar to the Dutch auction and 
distinctive from the English sequential auction.   
4. Second-Price Sealed Bid Auctions 
The second-price auction is also called the Vickery auction, after William 
Vickrey.10  It is conducted in the same fashion as the first-price sealed-bid auction.  
Bidders’ disclose the price with a sealed bid, information is asymmetric, and the highest 
bid wins the auction.  The distinction is that the winning bidder pays the price that second 
highest bidder set.           
                                                 
10 William Vickrey, “Counterspeculation, Auctions and Competitive Sealed Tenders,” Journal of 
Finance, 16 (1961): 8-37. 
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5. The Reverse Auction 
Defense auctions (or, more generally, procurement auctions) are mirror images of 
the auctions described above.  The conditions are the same, however, rather than having 
one seller and many buyers, DoD reverses the roles of the actors; one buyer and many 
sellers. In a reverse auction, the sellers are the bidders while the buyer is the bid-taker. In 
addition, the winning bidder is not the one who expresses willingness to pay the most, but 
the one who expresses willingness to be paid the least. 
6. Private, Correlated, and Common Value 
Thus far, we have assumed that the bidders all valued some item uniquely in that 
an actors’ valuation had no relationship with anyone else’s valuation.  There’s also little 
reason to believe that there would be a great amount discussion among the bidders 
inquiring about one another’s values.  Even if a discussion did take place there is little 
reason to believe that any individual would have an incentive to change their valuation 
based on the discussion.  Hence, each bidder’s valuation of the object has been 
independent (not related to another’s value) and private (not disclosed).   
Suppose, however, that an English auction were conducted to sell an item of 
speculative value, such as an estate.  All bidders are likely to have some information 
about the true value of the estate.  Imagine that Fred values it for the gravel he expects to 
extract from the stream at $200,000 and Barney values it for the oil he expects to extract 
at $400,000.  It is likely that Fred could value it more highly if he knew what Barney 
knows.  This is a case of correlated value.   
A common value auction describes a case where the overall benefit to the bidders 
is a fixed value common to all, e.g., oil below ground.11  All potential bidders may have 
private information regarding their individual assessment of the amount, or expected rates 
of profit based on their individual cost function; however, the resource is fixed.   
                                                 
11 Paul Klemperer, “What Really Matters in Auction Design,” Journal of Economic Perspectives, 16, 
no. 1 (Winter 2002): 169-189. 
http://www.jstor.org/search/AdvancedSearch?si=1&hp=25&q0=klemperer%2C+paul&f0=au&c0=AND&q
1=&f1=&c1=AND&q2=&f2=au&c2=AND&q3=&f3=ti&wc=on&Search=Search&sd=&ed=&la=&node.E
conomics=1&ic=08953309, Retrieved July 2007.  
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In defense auctions, it is rational to assume that sellers’ behavior mirrors that of 
buyers’ with independent private valuations.  However, because the bidders are sellers 
they have independent private costs rather than values.  They are independent because 
typically defense only allows one prime contractor to bid on any given requirement, 
therefore cost functions are by definition independent.12  One seller’s cost function is 
unrelated to any other.  It is also reasonable to assume that any given contractor would 
prefer to not to reveal their individual cost function to the buyer or other sellers; 
therefore, sellers’ costs are independent and private.   
7. Optimal Strategies 
When considering optimal bidding strategies assume that bidders’ have 
independent private values.  It is unnecessary to detail optimal strategies for common or 
correlated values because the model we are interested in is a defense auction.  Further, 
assume that all bidders’ wish to win the item.   
Suppose an English auction were conducted for a horse.  Suppose Bill knew with 
certainty that he would gain $1,500 worth of total value from the horse working on his 
ranch.  Further, assume that Bill is risk neutral.  Prior to the auction Bill could imagine a 
true state of nature value for the horse.  The state of nature value could be either higher or 
lower than his private value.  If the state of nature value were higher than his private 
value, it would be irrational for him to pay the additional amount because he would not 
be able to re-capture the additional sum.  If the state of nature value were lower than his 
private value, he would still be willing to pay up to $1,500 for the horse and capture the 
difference as consumer surplus.  Thus, all Bill needs to know is his individual private 
value.  The same condition prevails for all bidders.  Each individual’s optimal strategy is 
to continue bidding for the horse until the price exceeds their private value and then stop. 
Suppose the horse is now being sold in a first-price sealed-bid auction.  Bidders’ 
submit individual bids; highest bid wins and pays that amount.  Bill still values the horse 
at $1,500 and is risk neutral.  If he were to bid above $1,500 he could not re-capture the 
                                                 
12 FAR 9.603 allows for the exception of a disclosed “partnership arrangement,” however, in that case 
the partnership is treated as unitary.  
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sum, therefore he would not rationally pay above his private value.  He could bid either 
below $1,500 capturing some consumer surplus or at $1,500 capturing zero surplus.  The 
farther he bids below $1,500 the greater the probability of not being the highest bidder, 
but the closer he bids to $1,500 the lower his surplus.  Bill’s risk of loosing the auction 
will also increase if more bidders are present.  Imagine that there are n bidders and their 
private valuations are uniformly distributed between the highest possible valuation H and 
the lowest possible valuation L.  Bill’s optimal bid b is: 
 , where $1,500bb b b
v Lb v v
n
−= − =  
As n increases (competition) and as L increases Bill’s optimal strategy becomes to 
bid closer to his actual value ($1,500).13  Bill would not necessarily have to solve the 
equation for all n bidders.  If Bill was certain that the next lowest bidder had a value of 
$1,400 he would be able to substitute $1,400 for L and n would equal one, thus his 
optimal bid would be:   
 $1,500 $1,400$1,500 $1,400
1b
b −= − =  
If he were not certain, he would only know the probable value Pv of the next low 
bidder Li:   








                                                 
13 John G. Riley, “Expected Revenue from Open and Sealed Bid Auctions,” The Journal of Economic 





ac116457f1ee2&dpi=3&config=jstor, Retrieved November 2007. See Riley for a general form first-price 
sealed-bid optimum model.  
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The optimal strategy for each player is to shrink their bid by the amount equal to 
the difference between their value and what they perceive the next lowest value is.  Note 
that there is no need to address an optimal strategy related to a Dutch auction because 
they have the exact same informational components, so the Dutch auction and the first-
price auction are strategically the same.14 
Suppose the horse is now being offered in a second-price auction.  Bidders’ 
submit individual bids; highest bid wins, but pays the second-highest amount.  Bill values 
the horse at $1,500 and remains risk neutral.  Bill could bid higher than $1,500 in the 
hope that the second-price was lower than $1,500, but if that were the case, Bill would 
have won with a bid of $1,500 anyway.  Additionally, there is some risk that the second-
price will be above $1,500, in which case he could not re-capture the sum.  He has no 
incentive to place a bid higher than $1,500.  Bill could also submit a bid below $1,500 to 
raise his surplus, but his risk of loosing the horse increases.  In addition, if his below 
$1,500 bid wins he will capture some level of surplus in any case.  The increased risk of 
losing is not balanced with the equal likelihood of additional surplus (as was the case in 
the first-price auction) therefore he would not bid lower than $1,500.  Bill’s optimal 
strategy is a second-price auction is to bid the exact amount of his true value ($1,500).   
A bidder’s optimum strategy to gain some unit available at auction is summarized 
below: 
                                                 
14 Michael R. Baye, Managerial Economics and Business Strategy, Boston: Irwin McGraw-Hill, 2000: 
464.  
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Auction Type Optimal Strategy
English Bid up to true-value and stop
Dutch
First-price, sealed-bid












Figure 1.   Optimal Bid Strategies 
8. Revenue Equivalence  
Suppose an auction house had procured a horse and planned to hold a sales 
auction.  Which auction type might the auctioneer prefer if his goal were to maximize 
revenue, given that all bidders’ have independent private values?   
If using an English action the auctioneer can expect to receive the amount that has 
been called out last.  The winner receives the horse for that amount, however, the last 
valuation was made by the person with the second-highest valuation (made implicitly 
when they self-eliminated).  The individual with the highest valuation may have been 
willing to pay more, but the auctioneer cannot capture it.  The auctioneer’s expected 
revenue equals the second-highest valuation. 
If conducting a first-price sealed-bid or Dutch auction (we have already addressed 
their strategic equivalence) an auctioneer can expect to receive the amount equal to the 
highest-bid.  However, all bidders’ scale down their individual bids by the amount equal 
to what they perceive as the next lowest valuation.  Thus, the auctioneer’s expected 
revenue equals the second-highest valuation.   
If conducting a second-price auction an auctioneer can expect to receive the 
amount equal to the second-highest bid, which, we have shown, should also be the 
second-highest valuation.  Thus, if all bidders’ have independent private values the 
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expected revenue of the four common auctions is the same.  Auctioneers would be 
expected to be indifferent among the auction forms; this principle is commonly referred 
to as the revenue equivalence theorem.   
Note that the same analysis used above to prove revenue equivalence for forward 
auctions can be used to prove cost equivalence in a reverse auction.  In other words, in an 
independent private value reverse auction with rational risk-neutral bidders, the bid-taker 
(buyer) can expect the final contract price paid to be the same no matter what form of 
auction is used. 
B. EFFICIENCY MATTERS 
If the auctioneer (in the case of defense auctions the buyer) is expected to be 
indifferent among the various forms of auction, how can defense auctions (first-price 
sealed-bid) be less than optimally efficient?  What is efficiency?   
There are three general types of efficiency.  Allocative efficiency refers to a 
situation where all buyers who wish to buy—buy, and all sellers who wish to sell—sell, 
assuming productive efficiency is maximized.15  Productive efficiency is achieved when 
resources are produced at the lowest cost achievable.  Dynamic efficiency is a measure of 
how markets achieve greater allocative and productive efficiency over time.  A graphical 
depiction may be helpful: 
                                                 
15 Luis M. B. Cabral, Introduction to Industrial Organization, Cambridge: The MIT Press, 2000. This 




Figure 2.   Efficiency Illustration 
Suppose an oligopoly market in equilibrium depicted at (q’, p’), where (MCi) is 
the combined marginal cost function for the oligopolists.  Producer surplus is depicted at 
(ps’) and consumer surplus depicted at (cs’); however the market is not allocatively 
efficient because there is an efficiency loss at (el).  The efficiency loss represents buyers 
that would buy and sellers that would sell if it were a perfectly competitive market; thus 
the loss of efficiency.   
Now suppose the market were perfectly competitive with equilibrium output q’’.  
In this case all buyers with WTP above p’’ buy, and all sellers with cost below p’’ sell; 
the area (ps’) and (el’) become portions of newly attainable (cs”) or (ps”), an allocatively 
efficient and productively efficient market. 
Now suppose that over time productive or technological improvements are made 
at the oligopoly firms.  The initial marginal cost curve (MCi) shifts down and to the right 
to (MC).  The area (ps”’) represents the gain in producer surplus (note the area is larger 
than ps”, so it represents a real gain), and the area above the new price (p”’), becomes 
(c”’), additional consumer surplus.  Total surplus is increased, therefore there is a gain in 
allocative efficiency, and the marginal cost curve shift represents an increase in both 
productive and dynamic efficiency. 
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An increase in allocative efficiency means that more of a good is made and sold, 
at a lower price.  An increase in productive efficiency (which can be a movement along), 
or dynamic efficiency means that more goods are bought and sold for each dollar 
required to make the good.  Any efficiency increases result in more benefit per-dollar-
cost. 
Recall from the introduction section that defense’s ex ante problem is two fold.  
There’s a combinatorial optimization problem (what to ask for) and an information 
symmetry problem (neither party has a unilateral incentive to share information).  
Therefore defense may gain an improvement in allocative efficiency notwithstanding that 
competition may yield the same final auction price.   
In particular, consumer surplus in a defense auction is equal to the value that a 
contracted item provides minus the price paid.  Producer surplus in a defense auction is 
equal to the price received minus the production cost.  Consequently, total surplus is 
maximized (and full efficiency is achieved) by maximizing the difference between the 
value provided the government and the production cost.   
Full efficiency is difficult to achieve in the defense auction context, however, 
because of “incomplete information” about the buyer’s utility function. In particular, 
neither the buyer nor any seller knows with certainty which set of requirements or 
weighting among performance dimensions will generate the greatest value for DoD.  
Each actor (buyer or seller) has some idea about what will provide the most value, but 
nobody knows for certain.  This incomplete information condition not only makes it 
difficult to determine which specific product or product requirements will generate the 
most value but also makes it difficult to identify which seller can provide this value at the 
lowest production cost.  Consequently, full efficiency is difficult to achieve. 
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C. INFORMATION MATTERS 
Information has attributes, which distinguishes it from ordinary goods.16  Imagine 
a shop that sells two goods, information and apples.  All the characteristics of an apple 
can be observed prior to purchase; contrarily, if the keeper revealed the characteristics of 
information, other than the broadest, the keeper could no longer sell it.  A buyer may buy 
one, or more, apples; contrarily, each new piece of information is unique.  The keeper can 
only sell each apple once (ownership transfers); contrarily, the keeper can sell the same 
bit of information to all possible buyers, therefore, it is relatively non-rival in 
consumption.  Typical risks associated with information are that an optimal decision 
cannot be made without acquiring more and, as always, there is some chance that what an 
individual does know, is incorrect.   
Information is not sold in shops, in most cases, it is more generally acquired, 
usually through search and (as we highlighted in the background section) can be perfect 
or imperfect.  If information were perfect (symmetric) each individual would know 
everything there is to know.  Often information is imperfect (asymmetric) which implies 
some level of moral hazard, or at least, an opportunity to improve efficiency.         
When considering the value of information George Stigler highlighted some key 
principles.17  Suppose that Bill is in the market for crop insurance.  If Bill were to survey 
the market for the same amount and level of crop insurance, he may get a price range.  If 
he were to further survey the market a second time it is likely that the range of prices 




                                                 
16 Joeseph E. Stigletz, “The Contributions of the Economics of Information to Twentieth Century 
Economics,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 115, no. 4. (November 2000): 1441-1478.  
17 George J. Stigler, “The Economics of Learning,” The Journal of Political Economy, 69, no. 3. (June 
1961): 213-225, http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0022-
3808%28196106%2969%3A3%3C213%3ATEOI%3E2.0.CO%3B2-D, Retrieved November 2007.  
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Continuous canvassing of the market for information has diminishing gains.  
Stigler computed an optimal level of search for Bill and concluded that Bill should search 
until the marginal benefit of the search equaled the continued marginal cost of the 
search.18  In addition to the time value of information, surveying the market for facts is 
not the only information that may be relevant. 
1. Signaling 
Consider that there may be additional information problems regarding Bill’s crop 
insurance.  Imagine that two types of insurance seekers’ exist and that the two types are 
high-risk and low-risk.  Bill has perfect information regarding his type.  Bill’s objective is 
to gain as much coverage as possible per dollar.  An agent’s objective, however, is to 
maximize profit and therefore has a preference for selling polices to low-risk seekers.  
There’s some level of asymmetric information, but if Bill does nothing to communicate 
his type to the agent he risks not getting coverage.  Given the objectives, it may be in 
Bill’s best interest to behave in ways that signal to potential insurance agents that he’s a 
low-risk type.19  Information such as Bill’s access to water, frequency of fertilization, et 
cetera, would improve the likelihood that he could experience gains from trade.  As a 
mechanism a signal is some costly activity that an individual unilaterally conducts to gain 
some level of benefit at some time in the future.  Note that Bill’s type is not directly 
communicated to the agent.  A signal the he controls is transferred to the agent and the 
agent then decides to offer, or not offer, a policy at some price.   
2. Screening 
To demonstrate the difference between signaling and screening the illustration 
must take slightly different form.  Imagine that the two types of insurance seekers are 
now good-workers and poor-workers.  Also, imagine that the agent’s price quote depends 
on whether he actually, ex post, watered and fertilized the crop as he claimed he would.  
                                                 
18 Stigler, 217-218. 
19 Michael Spence, “Job Market Signaling,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 87, no. 3. (August 
1973): 355-374, http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0033-
5533%28197308%2987%3A3%3C355%3AJMS%3E2.0.CO%3B2-3, Retrieved November 2007.  
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Given this set of circumstances, Bill may have a disincentive to signal information 
regarding his type, i.e., if his type is poor-worker he would prefer to mask that data.  In 
any case, he has an incentive to signal good, notwithstanding the true state of nature that 
does exist.  Knowing this, the agent could discount his signal and may prefer to 
unilaterally require some form of screening mechanism to eliminate poor-workers, ex 
ante.20  The insurance agency would generally be better off if it were possible to screen 
seekers, ex ante, provided that the cost of the research necessary to develop an effective 
screening policy did not exceed the benefit of screening.   
Note that signaling and screening are similar but not synonymous.  A signal is 
related to some attribute (frequency of fertilization related to risk type) and one party can 
pursue it independently (not strictly related to current transaction).  A screening policy is 
generally imposed by the under-informed party as a condition to address an information 
asymmetry (good/poor worker) where the alternate party has a disincentive for truth-
telling (moral hazard).     
D. LITERATURE REVIEW SUMMARY 
There are four common forms of auctions: English, Dutch, first-price sealed-bid, 
and second-price.  English auctions begin by the (low) price announcement and continue 
until only one buyer remains, price is highest bid and the second-highest valuation.  
Optimal bidding strategy is to continue to bid unless/until the bid exceeds a player’s 
individual valuation.  A Dutch auction begins with descending price announcements and 
continues until someone agrees to accept, price is the last announced, but should equal 
second-highest valuation on average.  A first-price sealed-bid auction requires all players 
to document their sealed-bid and submit to the auctioneer or bid-taker.  Price paid equals 
the highest price bid, but should equal the second-highest valuation on average because 
the optimal strategy for each player is to shade down their individual bid until it equals 
the next highest valuation.  A second-price auction is the same as the first-price sealed-
bid auction except that the price paid is the second-highest price bid.  Players’ optimal 
                                                 
20 Joseph E. Stiglitz, “The Theory of Screening, Education, and the Distribution of Income,” The 
American Economic Review, 65, no. 3. (June 1975): 283-300, http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0002-
8282%28197506%2965%3A3%3C283%3ATTO%22EA%3E2.0.CO%3B2-0, Retrieved November 2007.  
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strategy is to bid their true valuation for the object, thus, the second-highest valuation is 
paid.  With risk-neutral bidders, auctioneers should be indifferent among the common 
auctions because expected revenue is the same for all.   
There are three forms of efficiency: allocative, productive, and dynamic.  If a 
market clears it is allocatively efficient.  Productive efficiency means that a good is made 
at the lowest possible cost.  Dynamic efficiency measures how much productive 
efficiency improves over time.  Improving allocative efficiency means that more of a 
good is made and sold, at a lower price.  An increase in productive efficiency (which can 
be a movement along), or dynamic efficiency, means that more goods are bought and 
sold for each dollar required to make the good.   
Information is different from ordinary goods and has some properties of public 
goods.  Imperfect information can prevent or reduce the efficiency of some transactions 
diminishing some of the gains from trade.  Information search has a cost that should be 
equated to the benefit.  Tacit information gathering, in the form of signaling, is a means 
to improve the likelihood that the trade will occur, or be more efficient.  Screening is an 
explicit form of information gathering that may be employed, when one party has an 
incentive to cheat, to improve the likelihood that some trade will occur, or be more 
efficient.   
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III. MODELING 
A. THE MODELS 
Developing a general auction model must be complete before any comparison 
between individual auctions can be made, and the model will offer a framework for 
understanding deviations that may be made.  Two distinct but complementary models 
will flow from the general form: A multiple-stage auction, and a single stage auction.  
The objective is to design and later compare the two models.   
B. GENERAL BUYER AND SELLER INCENTIVES 
Building a model of federal acquisition auctions requires understanding the initial 
situation and what a different model might achieve.  In any auctions, a boundless array of 
feasible attributes that could be measured exists; however, to model all possible auctions 
is undesirable.  It is therefore appropriate to set initial conditions equal for either model.   
Imagine that the array of quality elements is limited to two components: reliability 
(x) and delivery schedule (y).  Some tradeoff exists between the two elements of quality 
and can be expressed by weights placed on the two elements when determining overall 
quality.  In particular, overall quality is given by αx + βy, where α indicates the 
importance of or weight placed on reliability (x) while β is the importance of or weight 
placed on delivery schedule (y). The tradeoff between the two elements of quality is 
induced by making the additional assumption that α + β = 100.  Thus, if α is relatively 
high (i.e., reliability is relatively important) than β must be relatively low (i.e., delivery 
schedule is relatively less important), and vice versa. 
The overall value (η) to the DoD is determined by subtracting price (P) from 
quality (αx + βy).  In other words, we have: 
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overall value
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The discussion so far is applicable to any type of mechanism for federal 
procurement.  Value is a function of the magnitude and relative importance of the quality 
attributes, less the price.  At the same point in time, prior to the auction a contractor j has 
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In the firm’s cost function, the quality elements are quadratic because they are 
subject to the usual condition of increasing marginal costs.  In other words, if the firm 
doubles output, costs go up exponentially rather than at the same rate.  Thus, we now 
have two independent functions to describe the incentives of both the buyer and sellers 
for any type of or mechanism for federal procurement.      
1. Imperfect Information about Buyer (DoD) Preferences 
It is often the case that the buyer in any procurement (in this case, the DoD) has 
only imperfect information about its own preferences.  In other words, the buyer is not 
always fully aware of all possible capabilities of available technology nor is the buyer 
fully aware of the precise benefits of these capabilities. Similarly, contractors may have 
better (or at least different) information about the capabilities of available technology, but 
may have only an imprecise understanding of the benefits of these capabilities for the 
buyer. 
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In the model we have presented, this uncertainty about buyer value can be 
captured by assuming that both the buyer (DoD) and the sellers (contractors) have 
imperfect information about the true value of α and β, the weights on the different 
elements of quality, in the buyer’s value function. 
To represent this imperfect information condition, we can envision the 
information about α and β that is held by the buyer and each seller as being provided via 
a series of independent draws by each player from an opaque urn containing 100 balls.  In 
this urn, there are α black balls and β white balls (recall that α + β = 100).  An individual 
player (be it a buyer or seller) infers the true number of black and white balls in the urn 
(the true values of α and β) from the information they have received from their draws 
(the number of black and white balls). 
To represent the different levels of precision in information about buyer 
preferences, suppose that the buyer (DoD) draws mb balls from the urn while each seller 
(contractor) draws ms balls from the urn.  Note that the buyer might have more precise 
information than each contractor, in which case we would have mb > ms, or the buyer 
might have less precise information than each contractor, in which case we would have 
mb < ms. 
Recognize that if the buyer draws B black balls and W white balls from the urn, 
then his ex ante estimates of the values of α and β will be given by: 
buyer's ex ante estimate of the value of 
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Each individual contractor j’s ex ante estimate of the value of α and β (αj and βj) 
will be determined the same way based on the individual contractor’s draws from the urn. 
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C. A MULTIPLE STAGE AUCTION 
A multiple stage auction can be viewed as a sequential process of information 
revelation.   
 
 
Figure 3.   The Multiple Stage Auction 
The buyer, the seller, or both parties learn a piece of information in each stage.  
Additionally, one set of players’ (the array of contractors, or the DoD) have the 
opportunity to make a decision that maximizes their individual value. 
Suppose now that we were to take DoD’s value function, the contractors’ cost 
functions, and the ball drawing game and then imagine what a multi-stage auction would 
look like compared to the current federal auction process, based on these initial 
conditions.   
1. Stage One 
At stage one of the game all individual players draw balls out of the urn as 
described above. 
2. Stage Two 
In stage two of the game, each contractor j will submit a bid to the buyer (DoD) 
which consists of a price (Pj) and two quality elements (xj and yj). The objective each 
contractor has in stage two is to decide the optimal levels of P, x, and y based on the 
individual contractor cost function and the information about buyer preferences from the 
draw in stage one.  One player, the buyer, is excluded from play in stage two of this 
game. 
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An individual seller j has two crucial components of information.  First, the 
contractor has perfect knowledge of its individual cost function:  
2 2
j j j j jC a x b y= +  
The contractor also has some information (as much as – but different from – any 
other individual contractor) about the true values of α and β. 
Each auction stage will be conducted as a generalized multi-dimensional second-
price auction with all bids from each stage being binding (i.e., the buyer can accept and 
announce as the “winner” any bid from any contractor in any stage of bidding).  This will 
result in it being part of each contractor’s optimal (dominant) strategy to submit a bid in 
which price equals cost. Thus, each contractor j will set: 
2 2
j j j j j jP C a x b y= = +  
In addition, the contractors whose bids generate the lowest buyer value will be 
eliminated from the competition after the bidding in stage two, thus it is also part of each 
contractor’s optimal strategy to submit an overall bid which, given the contractor’s 
information, maximizes the value that it can profitably provide the buyer. Thus, with Pj 
already dictated as indicated above, it is the objective of contractor j in stage two to: 
2 2
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j j j j j j j
j j j j j j j j j j
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Given that there is no interaction between xj and yj in the above objective 
function, we can separate the objective into two independent objectives: 
2
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Each contractor j’s optimal bid can then be determined by differentiating each of 
the above objective functions (and setting the derivative equal to zero) to find the 
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Thus, in stage two, it is each contractor’s optimal strategy to submit a bid 






















Stage two closes when some array of contractors submits bids revealing their 
individual value for (x, y, P).  The initial submission must be binding to induce truth 
telling.  If stage two were not binding contractors would have an incentive to cheat (by 
submitting high value bids which the contractor cannot possibly provide profitably) in an 
effort to simply be selected for later rounds. 
3. Stage Three 
The objective of stage three is for the buyer to re-estimate the true values of α and 
β based on the bids submitted by contractors in stage two. The sellers do not play in stage 
three. 
In stage three, the buyer has two components of information from which he can 
estimate the true values of α and β.  First, the buyer knows his individual estimates from 
stage one (αb and βb).  Additionally, the buyer also knows the bids (xj, yj, Pj) for each  
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contractor in stage two.  However, because the individual contractors do not directly 
reveal their estimates of  α and β from stage one, the buyer must infer each contractor j’s 
estimates αj and βj based on his bid (xj, yj, Pj).  
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Thus, the buyer can infer the contractor’s estimates of αj and βj from each bid (xj, 
yj, Pj). Combining these estimates with the buyer’s own estimates αb and βb allows the 
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4. Stage Four 
The objective of stage four is to announce the updated estimate (αˆ , βˆ ) of the true 
values of (α, β).  The number of initial competitors is a key component of the auction 
because the larger the pool of information—the better the estimate. 
Additionally at this stage, the buyer will calculate the value generated by each 
contractor’s bid using the updated estimates of α and β.  Only a subset of contractors, 
those whose initial bids generated the greatest value, will be allowed to continue to stage 
five and beyond. 
5. Stage Five 
The objective of stage five of the auction is for the remaining contractors to re-
bid, after the buyer announces the improved estimates of α and β.  Stage five ends when 
each remaining contractor announces their final price. 
2 2
ˆˆChoose  and  to maximize
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j j j j j j j
j j j j j j j j j j
x y x y P




+ − −  
6. Stage Six 
The last stage of the auction is the award announcement.  The successful seller is 
the firm whose bid maximizes total value; however, the auction is conducted as a second-
price auction (to induce truth revelation) and therefore the winning firm is not paid its 
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own price bid.  Instead, the winning firm is paid the highest price that it could have bid 
and still won the auction.  In particular, suppose that the winning bid provided amounts 
of each quality element equal to x* and y* and the total value provided by the second-
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= + −  
Recall from above that using a second-price auction induces the contractors to 
reveal their real costs and that the revenue equivalence theorem implies that the buyer 
(defense) would have paid the same price, in any case.   
D. A SINGLE STAGE AUCTION 
In a single stage auction, the balls are drawn from the urn in stage one.  All 
players have some information about the true ratio.  Information is extracted in the same 
way: each player has the same absolute amount of independent information and each 
individual player’s private information may differ.  The information is exactly the same, 
in all respects, as the information that players begin with notwithstanding which form of 
auction is conducted (multi-stage, or single stage variation).   
Based on the initial draw there are several directions a possible single stage 
auction could take.  In this case, all depend on the buyer’s preference set, because the 
buyer (DoD) initiates the auction.  First, the buyer may communicate, or not 
communicate, the information they gained—as an individual player—from the initial 
draw because they can make a unilateral publishing decision.  Secondly, the buyer can set 
the decision criteria, therefore, can chose the outcome based on their ex ante draw, or the 




Figure 4.   Single Stage Auctions 
1. No Publish, Choice by Buyer Alpha 
It is possible for the buyer to refrain from publishing their private information and 
base their decision on their individual draw.  Therefore, the seller’s optimal bid would be 






















Moreover, the buyer’s optimal value would be determined by which seller has the 




max j b j b j jx y Pη α β= + −  
This auction approximates a situation in which a contracting officer is ambiguous 
about the evaluation criteria during the solicitation to mitigate protest risk, but the 
customer is fairly certain about their desired outcome.   
2. No Publish, Choice by Ex Post Weighted-Average Alpha 
It is possible for the buyer to refrain from publishing their private information and 
base their decision on the combination of their private draw, averaged with each 






















And the buyer’s optimal value would be determined by which seller has the 
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This auction approximates a situation in which a contracting officer is ambiguous 
about the evaluation criteria during the solicitation to mitigate protest risk, and the 
customer is uncertain about their desired outcome.   
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3. Publish, Choice by Buyer Alpha 
It is possible for the buyer to publish their private information (initial draw) and 
base their decision criteria on their draw.  In this case, the buyer is using its ex ante 
estimate ( bα , bβ ) as a best representative for the true value of (α, β).  Contractors then 






















This auction represents a defense auction in which the contracting officer places 
no weight on the information held by contractors regarding what product type offers the 
best value for DoD.  Contracting officers know what they intend to evaluate and are 
explicit regarding how the attributes are related.   
4. Publish, Choice by Ex Post Weighted-Average Alpha 
It is possible for the buyer to publish their private information (initial draw) and 
base their decision criteria on the average draw.  If this were done the contractor’s 
optimal strategy would be to calculate a weighted-average of the published bα , bβ  with 
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As in the original multi-stage model, the buyer would then re-estimate what the 
true values of α and β are based on the bids submitted by contractors. The mathematics 
of this re-estimation are more complicated in this case, however, given that the buyer 
must first extract each seller’s individual updated estimates ˆˆ and j jα β and must from 
these extract each seller’s original estimates αj and βj. Nonetheless, once the buyer has 
done so and produced aggregated re-estimated values ˆˆ and α β , the buyer’s optimal 
strategy would be to choose the highest value seller using these re-estimates. 
( )max ˆˆmax j j j jx y Pη α β= + −  
This auction matches the previous defense auction, except that during the auction 
the contracting officer has learned some new piece of information and would seek to 
apply the new information to the evaluation.   
E. MODEL SUMMARY 
The general model described the parameters of the auction, formalized a value 
function, and described ex ante information.  The multiple stage auction developed a 
process of information revelation, such that, buyer and seller could re-maximize the two 
variables to obtain higher value.  The single stage auction model allows the buyer to 
unilaterally determine the relative value of variables, varies more, and has no additional 
information revelation process.   
The critical distinction between a multiple stage auction and a single stage auction 
is the number of times signals transfer from buyer to seller, or seller to buyer.  In the 
multiple stage auction, the sellers communicate the private values of their draws and the 
buyer communicates their best estimate of the optimal value.  In the single stage auction 
the buyer may, or may not, communicate a draw signal, so the sellers optimize given the 
information available.    
The objective of modeling all variations of the auction model was to compare all 
possible forms.  Moreover, recall that prior to holding the auction the buyer has a 
computational problem to solve (the correct weights to apply to the value attributes) and 
an asymmetric information problem to overcome.  The possible efficacy gain in 
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allocative efficiency therefore can be expected to raise the gains from trade.  Productive 
efficiency is already being improved by holding an auction competition.  Analysis will 






A. SIMULATION MODEL 
To test the significance of the mathematical model, the relationships addressed in 
Section III were entered into a standard Excel spreadsheet.  The simulation mirrors 
precisely the model described in the modeling section.  The entire model can be viewed 
in Appendix A, however, this section will focus on the major features, display simulation 
outcomes, and analyze the outcomes.  The simulation model will be described by the 
input parameters, conduct of the auction, and how the outcomes of various auctions are 
measured.   
1. Input Parameters  
The first input parameters of the model are the seller cost curve parameters (aj and 
bj) are drawn from a uniform distribution.  Secondly, draws for estimated of α and β are 
binomially distributed around the true value.  Both inputs change in every auction 
simulation, for every seller and for the buyer.   
 
Sellers 6 Round 1 100
Retained 2 Draws α Draw α β  ai bi
Seller 1 5 2 40.0 60.0 4.38626 1.61734
Seller 2 5 3 60.0 40.0 5.80848 0.5585
Seller 3 5 2 40.0 60.0 3.49799 4.00502
Seller 4 5 4 80.0 20.0 2.46414 2.90553
Seller 5 5 4 80.0 20.0 4.24947 6.83271
Seller 6 5 0 0.0 100.0 1.97578 2.6196
Seller 7 5 2 40.0 60.0 6.64869 4.69526
Seller 8 5 4 80.0 20.0 9.28329 7.23153
Seller 9 5 4 80.0 20.0 6.29437 1.61405
Seller 10 5 4 80.0 20.0 2.39273 4.15416
Buyer 15 7 46.7 53.3
Binomial Actual Values










Figure 5.   Model Input Parameters 
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The number of sellers is changeable so that intensity of competitions can be 
addressed.  It is also interesting to vary the number of draws the sellers and buyers 
receive relative to another to answer the question: Is the multi-stage auction still an 
improvement over the standard auction when the buyer has more information than any 
individual seller at auction entry, and visa versa?  The Retained cell allows the model to 
eliminate competitors after stage three of the multi-stage auction. Recall that this is 
necessary to induce sellers to legitimately offer the initial bids that they believe provide 
the buyer the best value based on their parameter estimate.  The Revised Estimate cell 
calculates what the buyer would compute at stage-three of the multiple stage auction.    
2. Auction Conduct 
Each auction simulation will capture each contractor’s x, y, P values that they 
would submit, assuming they’re behaving optimally, given the knowledge available.   
 
 Perceived Actual PerceivedActual
X Y P Gov Value Gov Value Rank  α β X Y P Gov ValueGov ValueRank
5.3 16.5 564$        564$       415$       2 1 45.0 55.0 5.1 17.0 583$       460$      405$      4
4.0 47.7 1,367$     1,367$    784$       1 1 50.0 50.0 4.3 44.8 1,227$    1,009$   822$      1 1
6.7 6.7 333$        333$       333$       5 45.0 55.0 6.4 6.9 334$       329$      327$      5
9.5 9.2 466$        466$       470$       4 55.0 45.0 11.2 7.7 481$       482$      498$      3
5.5 3.9 232$        232$       253$       6 55.0 45.0 6.5 3.3 252$       253$      268$      6
11.8 10.2 547$        547$       569$       3 35.0 65.0 8.9 12.4 558$       486$      469$      2 1
1,367$    784$       1,009$   822$      
Buyer Surplus 564$       (19)$        Buyer Surplus 486$      299$      
Seller Surplus 803$       Seller Surplus 523$      
Check 1,367$    Check 1,009$   
Option 4:  One Stage-Buyer Publishes & Updates
Buyer ex post Weights
Option 3:  Buyer Publishes
Buyer ex ante Weights
 
Figure 6.   Auction Conduct 
Recall that the government has the unilateral choice regarding how to conduct the 
evaluation in the single-stage auctions.  Option-three simulates a FAR policy defense 
auction; the buyer publishes the evaluation criteria reflecting their ex ante weights 
(governments draw) and bases the decision on the buyers’ bid based on these ex ante 
weights max b j b j jx y Pη α β= + − .  Option-four allows the sellers to re-estimate α and β 
based on the buyer’s published draw; therefore, two additional columns are required; 
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choice is based on all the data available to all players, ex post.  The Perceived 
Government Value column calculates the valuation of η  for each contractor’s 
submission given the information available with the auction.  The Actual Government 
Value column calculates the valuation of η for each contractor’s submission given the 
true (but unknown) values of α and β.  Recognize that to measure and compare 
performance of the various auction models it is necessary to calculate the buyer’s and 
winning seller’s surplus.  Recall that the sum of the buyer’s and seller’s surplus is the 
measure of efficiency.    
3. Buyer’s Surplus 
The model will evaluate the winner of each auction within each simulation.  
Buyer’s and seller’s surplus will be measured and compared with the amount of surplus 
that would have been achieved had all parties had perfect information (the true weights 
are used to make bids and determine the winning seller).  Recognize that it is possible for 
the buyer’s surplus in any particular auction to exceed the buyer’s surplus that is achieved 
in the perfect information auction.  Note that in these cases the total surplus available 
does not increase, it merely depicts the share of the total surplus that is attributed to the 
buyer, or the seller, relative to the perfect information auction outcome.  For example, 
suppose that the value of actual buyer’s surplus in Option 2 was equal to 125%; this 
simply means that the buyer’s surplus achieved in Option 2 was 25% higher than the 
buyer’s surplus achieved in the perfect information auction.  If that were the case the 
buyer would be better off with the imperfect information auction outcome.  However, this 
not expected on average.   
4. Measuring Outcomes 
Of particular interest (because it directly measures efficiency) will be the columns 
(forecast variables) measuring Perceived Buyer Surplus (surplus the buyer thinks they are 
receiving given information known) and Actual Buyer Surplus (surplus buyer is actually 
receiving).  The third high interest metric is Consistency.  It measures the winner of all 
five auctions and compares the selected seller with the winner of the perfect information 
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auction; thus, it counts how frequently each auction chooses the incorrect seller.  The last 
forecast variable of interest is the Actual Total Surplus column.  It captures the percent of 
surplus that the auction achieves compared to the total surplus achieved if a perfect 
information auction were conducted.  If likened to a pie, Actual Total Surplus measures 
the size of the pie (large, medium, small) and the Actual Buyer Surplus captures the 


























Option 1  $        554  $     146  $     725  $     871 2 60.0 40.0 46.7 53.3 5.2 35.8 871$     110.24% 28.99% 196.98% 100.00% 1
Option 2  $        432  $     291  $     580  $     871 2 60.0 40.0 55.4 44.6 5.2 35.8 871$     85.99% 57.86% 157.55% 100.00% 1
Option 3  $        564  $      (19)  $     803  $     784 2 46.7 53.3 46.7 53.3 4.0 47.7 1,367$  112.11% -3.83% 218.11% 89.99% 1
Option 4  $        482  $     296  $     526  $     822 2 50.0 50.0 55.4 44.6 4.3 44.8 1,227$  95.93% 58.80% 142.94% 94.37% 1
Option 5  $        483  $     320  $     541  $     861 2 55.4 44.6 55.4 44.6 4.8 39.9 1,023$  95.95% 63.66% 146.78% 98.80% 1
 $        503  $     503  $     368  $     871 2 60 40 60 40 12.2 6.9 503$     
Buyer Evaluates X, Y
Buyer Doesn't Publish
Buyer ex ante  Weights
Two Stage-Buyer Updates
Buyer ex post  Weights
Perfect Information
One Stage-Buyer Publishes
Buyer ex post Weights
Seller Chooses X, Y
Buyer Doesn't Publish
Buyer ex post Weights
Buyer Publishes
Buyer ex ante Weights
 
Figure 7.   Auction Outcome Metrics 
B. VALUABLE COMPARISONS  
The comparisons that are most interesting, i.e., relevant to improving the defense 
auction, are: 1) How does the buyer’s surplus vary between perceptions and actual, 2) 
How much surplus does the buyer gain between multi-stage versus single-stage auctions 
(especially option 3, the federal policy auction), 3) How do outcomes change as the 
number of draws given each player varies, 4) How do outcomes change when the number 
of contractors retained in the multi-stage auction vary?   
The model will track actual and perceived surplus and consistency as the 
measures of efficiency improvement.  Six simulation variations, each consisting of 
25,000 individual simulations will be run to test the veracity of the model.  The variations 
will be as follows: 
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1 2 3 4 5 6
Buyer's Draws 15 15 5 5 15 15
Sellers' draws 15 15 15 15 5 5
Beginning Sellers' 10 4 10 4 10 4
Retained Sellers' 5 2 5 2 5 2
Simulation #
 
Table 1.   Simulation Auction Variations  
C. SIMULATION OUTCOMES  
The number of simulations for each auction variation is 25,000.  Data from each 
forecast variable (perceived buyer surplus, actual buyer surplus, consistency, and percent 
of total surplus) is available in Appendices B-G.  Analysis will focus on the average 
performance of each forecast variable.  Data on the average performance is provided 
below. 
Auction Option 1 2 3 4 5 6 Mean 
No publish choice ex ante (O-1)
  Mean perceived buyer surplus 97.71 94.16 103.23 95.03 89.89 85.01 94.17
  Mean actual buyer surplus 80.64 81.68 63.26 62.26 70.47 68.31 71.10
  Perceived less actual 17.07 12.48 39.97 32.77 19.42 16.7 23.07
  Mean total surplus 89.64 90.78 84.96 86.7 81.84 81.66 85.93
  Consistency 25 19 32 26 32 26 26.67
No publish choice ex post (O-2)
  Mean perceived surplus 95.71 94.95 95.79 95.02 88.42 86.07 92.66
  Mean actual surplus 92.71 91.98 92.78 92.19 80.83 78.95 88.24
  Perceived less actual 3 2.97 3.01 2.83 7.59 7.12 4.42
  Mean total surplus 94.2 94.04 94.26 94 85.71 84.79 91.17
  Consistency 10 8 10 8 22 19 12.83
Publish choice ex ante (O-3)
  Mean perceived surplus 108.27 105.62 123.36 117.2 108.09 105.53 111.35
  Mean actual surplus 77.62 76.07 41.75 32.92 78.04 75.85 63.71
  Perceived less actual 30.65 29.55 81.61 84.28 30.05 29.68 47.64
  Mean total surplus 90.18 91.8 76.1 77.78 90.4 91.61 86.31
  Consistency 20 13 26 19 19 13 18.33
Publish choice ex post (O-4)
  Mean perceived surplus 98.46 97.95 97.12 96.51 98.94 97.95 97.82
  Mean actual surplus 95.54 94.98 94.12 93.69 91.61 91.08 93.50
  Perceived less actual 2.92 2.97 3 2.82 7.33 6.87 4.32
  Mean total surplus 96.64 96.76 97.11 95.28 94.49 94.71 95.83
  Consistency 8 5 10 8 11 8 8.33
Multi-stage auction (O-5)
  Mean perceived surplus 100.83 99.7 100.87 99.77 100.1 95.93 99.53
  Mean actual surplus 97.89 96.78 97.87 96.89 92.74 88.99 95.19
  Perceived less actual 2.94 2.92 3 2.88 7.36 6.94 4.34
  Mean total surplus 98.88 99.03 98.83 98.92 96.55 96.03 98.04
  Consistency 7 5 7 7 13 12 8.50
Simulation Variation
 




The Mean column provides the average performance of each forecast variable for 
all auction variations.  It is evident that on average the multi-stage auction yields the 
buyer greater actual total surplus than any of the single-stage auction variations; however, 
the questions of interest should be examined in more detail.   
1. Single-Stage versus Multi-Stage Auctions 
To determine the mean performance of the single-stage auction it is necessary to 
average the performance of each forecast variable.  To determine the level of 
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A table comparing the average performance of all of the single-stage auctions 
with the multi-stage auction is below. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 Mean 
Mean Single-stage Auction
  Mean actual surplus 86.63 86.18 72.98 70.27 80.24 78.55 79.14
  Perceived less actual 13.41 11.9925 31.8975 30.675 16.0975 15.0925 19.86
  Consistency 15.75 11.25 19.5 15.25 21 16.5 16.54
  Mean total surplus 92.665 93.345 88.1075 88.44 88.11 88.1925 89.81
Multi-stage Delta
  Mean actual surplus 0.1300 0.1230 0.3411 0.3789 0.1558 0.1329 0.2103
  Perceived less actual -0.7808 -0.7565 -0.9059 -0.9061 -0.5428 -0.5402 -0.7387
  Consistency -0.5556 -0.5556 -0.6410 -0.5410 -0.3810 -0.2727 -0.4911
  Mean total surplus 0.0671 0.0609 0.1217 0.1185 0.0958 0.0889 0.0921  
Table 3.   Multi-stage Auctions Compared to All Single-stage Auctions  
Observe that the multi-stage auction achieves 21% more actual buyer’s surplus 
than the single-stage auction.  The multi-stage auction results in the buyer choosing a 
different seller than they would have chosen, given perfect information, 49% less 
frequently than if the buyer had utilized a single-stage auction.  The multi-stage auction 
also results in 9% more total surplus than the average single-stage auctions.  Hence, on 
average the buyer attains a larger pie (actual total surplus) and receives 21% more of the 
larger pie.   
Recall that perceived surplus measures what the buyer perceives as their surplus 
gained, given the buyer’s level of knowledge.  The row Perceived less actual computes 
the difference between the buyers incorrect perception and the actual surplus they 
 41
achieved (the multi-stage auction buyer is approximately 5% incorrect).  On average the 
buyer in the single-stage auction is 20% incorrect regarding their level of surplus; the 
multi-stage auction corrects approximately 74% of the misperception.   
Recognize, however, that auction Option 4 is currently prohibited from use by 
federal contracting officers according to FAR regulations; therefore, it should be 
excluded so that the results are applicable to current federal auctions.21  A summary of 
the data is below. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 Mean 
Mean Single-stage Auction
  Mean actual surplus 83.66 83.24 65.93 62.46 76.45 74.37 74.35
  Perceived less actual 16.91 15.00 41.53 39.96 19.02 17.83 25.04
  Consistency 18.33 13.33 22.67 17.67 24.33 19.33 19.28
  Mean total surplus 91.34 92.21 85.11 86.16 85.98 86.02 87.80
Multi-stage Delta
  Mean actual surplus 0.1701 0.1626 0.4845 0.5513 0.2131 0.1966 0.30
  Perceived less actual -0.8396 -0.7810 -0.8676 -0.8370 -0.6975 -0.6410 -0.78
  Consistency -0.62 -0.63 -0.69 -0.60 -0.47 -0.38 -0.56
  Mean total surplus 0.0825 0.0740 0.1612 0.1481 0.1229 0.1164 0.12  
Table 4.   Multi-Stage Auction Compared to Single-Stage Options 1-3 
Observe that on average if the buyer had conducted a multi-stage auction they 
achieve a 12% larger pie and receive 30% more of the larger pie.  The buyer also chooses 
the incorrect seller 56% less frequently and their perception of surplus is corrected by 
about 78%.     
It also may be valuable to highlight the policy auction, Option 3; the buyer knows 
the requirement and evaluates the auction according to their ex ante information.22   
Publish choice ex ante (O-3)
  Mean actual surplus 77.62 76.07 41.75 32.92 78.04 75.85 63.71
  Perceived less actual 30.65 29.55 81.61 84.28 30.05 29.68 47.64
  Mean total surplus 90.18 91.8 76.1 77.78 90.4 91.61 86.31
  Consistency 20 13 26 19 19 13 18.33
Multi-stage Delta
  Mean actual surplus 0.2611 0.2722 1.3442 1.9432 0.1884 0.1732 0.6971
  Perceived less actual -0.9041 -0.9012 -0.9632 -0.9658 -0.7551 -0.7662 -0.8759
  Mean total surplus 0.0965 0.0788 0.2987 0.2718 0.0680 0.0482 0.1437
  Consistency -0.6500 -0.6154 -0.7308 -0.6316 -0.3158 -0.0769 -0.5034  
Table 5.   Multi-Stage Auction versus a FAR Policy Auction, Option 3 
                                                 
21 FAR 15.301—Proposal Evaluation.  
22 Ibid. 
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Observe that on average the buyer achieves a 14% larger pie and a 70% larger 
apportionment utilizing a multi-stage auction; chooses the incorrect seller 50% less 
frequently, and corrects their perception 87% compared to the policy federal auction.   
2. Comparisons when Competition and Information Vary 
Recall that we also expressed interest in analyzing the single and multiple stage 
auctions as the level of competition varied from high to low and as the level of 
information varied from high to low.  The means of discrimination are as follows: 
 Information & Competiton 1 2 3 4 5 6
Buyers' draws 15 15 5 5 15 15
Sellers' draws 15 15 15 15 5 5
Number of sellers' entering auction 10 4 10 4 10 4
Number of seller draws 150 60 150 60 50 20
Total number of draws 165 75 155 65 65 35
Simulation #
 
Table 6.   Levels of Competition and Information 
Simulations 1-3-5 include the highest level of competition (underlined), and therefore 
represent the relatively high competition auctions.  It is also evident that simulations 1-2-
3 include the three highest-information scenarios (Bold-italics), and therefore can 
represent the high information auctions.  It is further evident that that the sellers obtained 
more draws (information) than the buyer in simulations 3-4 and vice versa in simulations 
5-6.   
It is also most appropriate to compare the multi-stage auction with the three single 
stage auctions that are not prohibited (Options 1-2-3).  A comparison of the forecast 
variables across the simulations and among the auction options yields: 
1 2 3 4 5 6
Mean             
high-competion
Mean          
low-competion
Mean     high-
info draw
Mean      low-
info draw
Multi-stage auction 
  Mean actual surplus 97.89 96.78 97.87 96.89 92.74 88.99 96.17 94.22 97.51 92.87
  Perceived less actual 2.94 2.92 3.00 2.88 7.36 6.94 4.43 4.25 2.95 5.73
  Mean total surplus 98.88 99.03 98.83 98.92 96.55 96.03 98.09 97.99 98.91 97.17
  Consistency 7.00 5.00 7.00 7.00 13.00 12.00 9.00 8.00 6.33 10.67
Mean Single-stage Auction (Opt. 1-3)
  Mean actual surplus 83.66 83.24 65.93 62.46 76.45 74.37 75.34 73.36 77.61 71.09
  Perceived less actual 16.91 15.00 41.53 39.96 19.02 17.83 25.82 24.26 24.48 25.60
  Mean total surplus 91.34 92.21 85.11 86.16 85.98 86.02 87.48 88.13 89.55 86.05
  Consistency 18.33 13.33 22.67 17.67 24.33 19.33 21.78 16.78 18.11 20.44
Multi-stage auction Improvement
  Mean actual surplus 0.28 0.28 0.26 0.31
  Perceived less actual -0.83 -0.82 -0.88 -0.78
  Mean total surplus 0.12 0.11 0.10 0.13
  Consistency -0.59 -0.52 -0.65 -0.48  
Table 7.   Single versus Multiple Stage Auctions as Competition and Information Vary 
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Observe that the high-competition auctions are superior to the low-competition 
auctions at approximately the same rate; and the improvement upon the single stage 
auction is similar among all forecast variables except consistency.  In the high-
competition multi-stage auctions, the buyer chooses the incorrect seller 1% more 
frequently than in the low-competition environment; in the high-competition single stage 
auction buyers chose the incorrect seller 5% more frequently than in the low-competition 
environment.  Note, however, that the improvement in the buyer’s selection of the correct 
seller partially reflects the smaller pool of possible sellers (4) in the low-competition 
environment the buyer’s mathematically less likely to choose incorrectly.  Thus, we can 
conclude that the multiple stage auction offers about the same level of improvement upon 
the single stage auction in high and low competitive environments.   
A slightly different story is evident in high-low information environments.  A 
multi-stage auction improves the buyer’s average actual surplus by 31% in the low-
information environment (5% more than in the high-information environment) and the 
total average surplus by 13% (3% more than in the high-information environment).  Note 
that again the buyer’s risk of adverse selection is not as significant as in the high-
information environment; however, it is evident that the multi-stage auction offers the 
buyer the most significant improvement over the single stage auction in information thin 
(scarce) markets.   
It is also possible to observe changes in outcomes as the buyer has more, or fewer 
draws than each individual seller.  Consider the average data depicted below: 
1 2 3 4 5 6
sellers' draws  
exceed buyer's
buyer's draws   
exceed sellers'
Multi-stage auction 
  Mean actual surplus 97.89 96.78 97.87 96.89 92.74 88.99 97.38 90.87
  Perceived less actual 2.94 2.92 3 2.88 7.36 6.94 2.94 7.15
  Mean total surplus 98.88 99.03 98.83 98.92 96.55 96.03 98.88 96.29
  Consistency 7 5 7 7 13 12 7.00 12.50
Mean Single-stage Auction (Opt. 1-3)
  Mean actual surplus 83.66 83.24 65.93 62.46 76.45 74.37 64.19 75.41
  Perceived less actual 16.91 15.00 41.53 39.96 19.02 17.83 40.75 18.43
  Mean total surplus 91.34 92.21 85.11 86.16 85.98 86.02 85.63 86.00
  Consistency 18 13 23 18 24 19 20.17 21.83
Multi-stage auction Improvement
  Mean actual surplus 0.52 0.20
  Perceived less actual -0.93 -0.61
  Mean total surplus 0.15 0.12
  Consistency -0.65 -0.43  
Table 8.   Single versus Multiple Stage Auctions as Buyer-Seller Information Varies 
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Observe that if the buyer were to conduct a single stage auction they are clearly 
better off having more information than any individual seller (e.g., 10% average actual 
surplus).  Contrarily, the situation is reversed if a buyer were conducting a multi-stage 
auction (7% improvement in average actual surplus if sellers have more information).  
This reflects the fact that the multi-stage auction exploits the sellers’ information, while 
most of the single stage auctions do not.  As a result, performance increases when all 
sellers have more information as opposed to the one buyer.  Again, the buyer is 
absolutely better off choosing a multi-stage auction.  Note that the greatest improvement 
over the single stage auction is when the buyer has relatively less information about what 
their true need is.   
Generally, we may conclude that the multi-stage auction should be an especially 
attractive tool when the buyer has a low level of information either relative to the market, 
or the sellers.     
D. SUMMARY OF ANALYSIS 
If utilizing a single-stage auction, not explicitly prohibited by regulation, the 
buyer over-estimates the amount of buyer’s surplus achieved by 25%; the multi-stage 
auction corrects about 80% of the misperception.  The multi-stage auction provides the 
buyer both a larger pie and a larger apportionment in all cases when compared to the 
single-stage auction.  Both the high-competition and the high-information auction are 
superior for the buyer when the multi-stage auction is used.  The multi-stage auction is 
most desirable to use when information is scarce.   
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. OUTCOMES DISCUSSION  
The simulation model demonstrates that a buyer should prefer the multi-stage 
auction over the single-stage auction.  The multi-sage auction solves the computational 
problem (what is the optimal requirement) and overcomes the information asymmetry 
problem by systematically revealing objective information in the first stage.  The FAR 
mandates a Best Value basis for award that also minimizes operations overhead.23  
Multiple stage auctions may accomplish both objectives, by making best value explicit, 
and by minimizing the amount of time that may be spent conducting market research and 
crafting an acquisition strategy.   
1. Hypothetical Comparison 
To demonstrate how this may be implemented it is useful to imagine the same 
requirement being auctioned with a single or multiple stage auction.  Suppose an agency 
had requirements for waste disposal, grounds maintenance, and landscaping maturing in 
the same contract period.  Initially some appear to be complimentary and perhaps could 
be consolidated, however, the appropriate combination of quality, time, and price trade-
offs that create an optimal contract is not self-evident.   
If the standard auction model were used it could take months to gather enough 
data to formulate a useful strategy. During the market research and requirement 
generation phases (work statement revision), there is no systematic way to ensure the 
outcome (metrics and probable evaluation criteria) will trade-off attributes correctly, or 
enable contract performance.  How much overhead could be saved consolidating the 
requirements?  What is the ideal range for grass length: two-to-three inches, or one-to-
four, and what is the price difference?  In any case, it is a difficult process to get correct.   
                                                 
23 FAR 1.102-2—Performance Standards. 
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If the multi-stage auction were used, a Statement of Objectives could be 
developed that outlines broad acquisition goals.24  Contractors could then combine the 
contracts in whatever manner they felt was appropriate (according to their individual cost 
function and individual draw).  The contacting officer would have a great-deal more 
information from which to trade-off price, schedule, and quality and develop an optimal 
Statement of Work and evaluation criteria (signaling the true weights).  Contractors 
would incorporate the information into their Final Proposal Revision, resulting in a more 
efficient outcome.  Further, because the research burden is placed on the contractors it 
may significantly reduce Procurement Acquisition Lead Time (PALT). 









1 ACQ Steps (Multi-Stage)
2 Synopsis
3 Solicit with SOO
4 Evaluate and Optimize SOW
4a   Set Requirement
4b   Market Research
4c   Acquistion Strategy





Figure 8.   Hypothetical Timeline for Processing Single versus Multi-stage Auctions 
Initial research would not be as critical to program success because the multi-
stage auction assumes the eventual requirement is an outcome of the auction, rather than 
predefined.   
Additional benefits of broadly defining a desired outcome ex ante (similar to the 
way DoD 5000 series determines capabilities), and optimizing during the auction process 
is that the trade-offs become self-evident.  In the standard auction model there is no way 
to assess the quality of market research to ensure the correct trade-offs have been 
identified or made.  The multi-stage auction couples both market research and optimal 
acquisition strategy into the auction.  The effect is that the multi-stage auction will 
achieve the best value per-dollar-cost.   
                                                 
24 FAR 37.602. 
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Contracting officers may also achieve better outcomes in information thin 
environments, such as contingencies.  For example, suppose a field commander has some 
knowledge about what they ultimately want, but lacks resources to adequately prepare a 
definitive requirement.  The standard auction requires that they define the requirement 
before the auction is conducted—consuming the scarcest good among all possible goods: 
time—and there is no guarantee that the supplies, or services, are obtainable in immature 
environments.  However, the multi-stage auction would allow commanders to quantify 
and trade-off important factors, such as time versus quality, and transfer some of the 
research burden to the contractors:  a more efficient outcome.   
B. IMPLEMENTATION DISCUSSION 
A possibly significant implementation barrier may be the Bona Fide need rule; 
however, as part of the DoD 5000 series revision “capabilities” replaced predetermined 
“assets” as the desired objective.25  A multi-stage auction has a similar implementation 
path.  But, inasmuch as the bona fide need rule is fiscal law addressing the timing of 
obligations relative to fiscal year needs, there is little evidence from the Government 
Accountability Office that establishing a “perfectly defined minimum need,” is the 
primary concern.26 
Some acquisition reformers have observed that improving the acquisition process 
may be zero-sum.27 Others have argued that acquisition will flounder until the President, 
in concert with Congress, enacts sweeping reform.28  Multi-stage auctions, however, may 
be implemented as a policy level change, or unilaterally by any contracting officer.    
                                                 
25 Defense Acquisition University, “Defense Acquisition Guidebook,” 1st Edition, November 2006, 
https://akss.dau.mil/dag/GuideBook/PDFs/GBNov2006.pdf, Retrieved October 2007.   
26 GAO-04-261SP, “Principles of Federal Appropriations Law,” 3rd Edition, Volume 4, January 2004, 
http://www.gao.gov/special.pubs/d04261sp.pdf, especially Chapter V, Retrieved October 2007.  
27 Richard K. Sylvester and Joseph A. Ferrara, “Implementing Evolutionary Acquisition,” Acquisition 
Review Quarterly, Winter 2003, http://www.dau.mil/pubs/arq/2003arq/arq2003.asp#winter, Retrieved 
October 2007.  
28 Mark Cancian, “Acquisition Reform: It's Not As Easy As It Seems,” Acquisition Review Quarterly, 
(Summer 1995), http://www.dau.mil/pubs/arq/arq95.asp, Retrieved October 2007.  
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1. Policy Path 
Reforming federal acquisition policy is one way to implement multiple stage 
auctions.  Under this option, the auction is moved up-front, possibly requiring a FAR 
work-around, such that an auction can precede synopsis, market research and acquisition 
strategy.  This option is the path of most resistance.  The current FAR mandates 
completing these major stages prior to solicitation and that each stage is discrete.  A 
policy change that blends them into the auction may require years of policy 
entrepreneurship to implement.  If this opportunity were to be pursued it may be 
advisable to seek a blanket waiver for a limited time period, to demonstrate the possible 
benefits.  The benefits may have to be measured and reported for several years before 
policy change is even considered.   
2. Unilateral Path 
A unilateral approach may also be conducted.  Strategies that can be implemented 
at the micro-policy level to achieve benefits, while simultaneously avoiding any policy 
maker having to spend political capital, are more likely to be effectively implemented.   
The unilateral option supposes that a contracting officer abbreviates the initial 
acquisition steps, such as market research and acquisition strategy, by arguing that: 
“they’re coupled into the auction.”  A unilateral implementation may use a Statement of 
Objectives; however, the contacting officer could review offers for the optimal approach 
(quotes if conducted for supplies) rather than accepting the offeror’s Statement of Work, 
and issue an amendment seeking prices based upon the revised ideal work statement.29  
Note that the unilateral implementation applies to service and weapons systems 
acquisition; a design-build implementation could be applied to construction projects.30 
This is similar to selecting from a priced menu, or an array of menus.  Imagine an 
individual dining-out using the standard auction model.  She must set the requirement—
chicken—decide which attributes are important—taste, atmosphere, service level—and 
                                                 
29 FAR 37.602.  
30 FAR 36.3—Two Phase Design-Build Selection Procedures. 
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when the prices are known make a selection.  If she used a multi-stage auction, she would 
gather the menus of all the restaurants in town and have near perfect information when 
making a choice.  Additionally, she could make many choices, gaining contract 
flexibility.  To equate this to defense procurements, it adds flexibility to contracts and 
makes evident the price-value trades required.  Negotiating flexible contracts could be 
especially valuable if the budget is unstable.    
Additionally, an agency could unilaterally revise their individual policies and 
procedures to conduct multi-stage auctions.  Guidance may be useful to ensure that a 
multi-stage auction is used effectively rather than just to bypass FAR Parts 6 & 10, and 
could look similar to agency guidance applicable to reverse auctions.31 
C. ADDITIONAL RESEARCH 
Additions to the basic models may be conducted.  A researcher could include 
additional attributes ( , , , ,X Y A B C D⇒ ).  A researcher could also gather field evidence 
to determine whether existing contracts had been awarded to the optimal firm(s).  
Another path could be to run an experiment and later an implementation test.  The 
experiment would use a stylized procurement situation in a laboratory setting while an 
implementation test would involve one region running a traditional auction while one 
runs multi-stage auctions, then compare.    
D. FINAL COMMENTS 
Auction theory can be utilized to achieve more efficient defense auctions, 
improving value and possibly decreasing administrative work-load (fewer ex ante steps).  
The process demonstrated may be implemented by an individual contracting officer, or at 
all departmental levels, with or without formal policy changes.  The multi-stage auction 
may improve service and contingency contracting outcomes because it is likely to get 
better offers in information thin environments and does not anchor on a pre-set 
requirement.   
                                                 
31 Susan L. Turley, “Wielding the Virtual Gavel--DoD Moves Forward with Reverse Auctions,” Air 
Force Institute of Technology (Thesis), CI02-91, 15-26, (2002).  
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APPENDIX A: SIMULATION MODEL 
 
 
  Sellers 10 Round 1 100  Perceived Actual  Perceived Actual  PerceivedActual  PerceivedA
Retained Rd 2 5 Draws a Draw a ß  ai bi X Y P Gov Value Gov Value Rank Imputed a Imputed ß Gov Value Gov Value Rank X Y P Gov ValueGov Value Rank  a ß X Y P Gov ValueG













































































































































































































































Buyer Surplus 486$ 
 
$
Probability 0.6 60 40 Seller Surplus 725$ 
 
Seller Surplus 580$ 
 
Seller Surplus 803$ 
 
Seller Surplus 523$ 
 








Check 44.6 Uniform 
Lower 0.5 0.5 

























Option 1  $        554  $     146  $     725  $     871 2 60.0 40.0 46.7 53.3 5.2 35.8 871$ 
 
91.15% 23.97% 275.87% 100.00% 1 
Option 2  $        432  $     291  $     580  $     871 2 60.0 40.0 55.4 44.6 5.2 35.8 871$ 
 
71.10% 47.85% 220.64% 100.00% 1 
Option 3  $        564  $      (19)  $     803  $     784 2 46.7 53.3 46.7 53.3 4.0 47.7 1,367$ 
 
92.70% -3.17% 305.46% 89.99% 1 
Option 4  $        486  $     299  $     523  $     822 2 50.0 50.0 55.4 44.6 4.3 44.8 1,227$ 
 
79.88% 49.18% 198.89% 94.37% 1 
Option 5  $        483  $     320  $     541  $     861 2 55.4 44.6 55.4 44.6 4.8 39.9 1,023$ 
 
79.33% 52.64% 205.57% 98.80% 1 
 $        608  $     608  $     263  $     871 2 60 40 60 40 15.2 7.6 608$ 
 
Two Stage-Buyer Updates
Buyer ex post Weights
Perfect Information
One Stage-Buyer Publishes
Buyer ex post Weights
Seller Chooses X, Y
Buyer Doesn't Publish
Buyer ex post Weights
Buyer Publishes
Buyer ex ante Weights
Buyer Evaluates X, Y
Buyer Doesn't Publish
Buyer ex ante Weights
Individual Draw Contractors' Cost Functions Option 1:  Buyer Doesn't PublishBuyer ex ante Weights
Revised Estimate 
Option 2:  Buyer Doesn't Publish 
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APPENDIX B: SIMULATION ONE 







































APPENDIX C: SIMULATION TWO 









































APPENDIX D: SIMULATION THREE 













































APPENDIX E: SIMULATION FOUR 













































APPENDIX F: SIMULATION FIVE 












































APPENDIX G: SIMULATION SIX 
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